
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27 October 1961

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CENTRAL

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BULLETIN



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State Dept. review completed

TOP SECRET

27 October 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

25X1	
	3. Laos: Moscow again urges Ambassador Harriman to expedite Laos settlement. (Page 11)
	4. Albania: Demonstrations held in support of Hoxha's defiance of Moscow. (Page 111)
	 Communist China - Albania: Peiping radio reiterates support for Tirana regime. (Page tv)
	6. Dominican Republic: Opposition groups moving toward a coalition with regime. (Page 1v)
25X1	
25X6	

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	Approved For Rel	ase 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A	006000260 8 51×6
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25X1	man in Geneva that tion" and "use its give Souvanna a fr bers of a coalition	at it hopes the US "will take a influence" with the Boun Oum	realistic posi- government to eutralist mem- per, Soviet del-
25X1	man in Geneva that tion" and "use its give Souvanna a fr bers of a coalition	at it hopes the US "will take a influence" with the Boun Oum ee hand in choosing the eight national Lao government. On 25 October	realistic posi- government to eutralist mem- per, Soviet del-
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	27 Oct 61	DAILY BRIEF	iii	
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	27 Oct 61	DAILY BRIEF	iv	25X1



Peiping Preparing Response to Khrushchev

The airing of the intrabloc dispute in <u>People's Daily</u> at this time may be intended to inform the party rank and file of the situation prior to the appearance of an official party statement. The Chinese response is probably being hammered out in politburo sessions in Peiping following the return of Chou En-lai from Moscow. Chou was met at Peiping airport by Mao Tse-tung and seven other politburo members. This unusual greeting appears to be a deliberate move to show approval for Chou's stand at the congress and to demonstrate the solidarity of the Chinese leadership in the face of the Soviet challenge.

The Chinese delegation to the CPSU congress, meanwhile, is touring Leningrad, probably awaiting the outcome of the politburo deliberations or the return of Chou. Pravda staff members claim that the Chinese premier is expected back in Moscow after his consultations.

In contrast to their treatment of previous CPSU congresses, the Chinese have given little press and radio coverage to the current meeting and have balanced against it reports of Albanian achievement. Before leaving Moscow, Chou laid a wreath on Stalin's tomb bearing the inscription "the great Marxist-Leninist," in contrast to the Chinese premier's earlier criticism of Khrushchev for his lack of a "serious Marxist-Leninist attitude" in publicizing the differences with Albania. On 26 October, Peiping quoted the assurance given by the head of a Chinese delegation now in Albania that Communist China would stand as a "comrade-in-arms" with Tirana "under all conditions."


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President Balaguer has repeatedly stated, most recently in an address to the nation on 23 October, that he considers participation by the opposition in a coalition government the crucial next step in his liberalization program. Coalition negotiations, which broke down earlier this month, may shortly be resumed. In the earlier negotiations the National Civic Union (UCN) had given the President a detailed list of conditions for its participation, which were then publicized. The President called the UCN attitude "intransigent" and its demand for General Ramfis Trujillo's departure "inadmissible." He did, however, indicate that other UCN conditions might be negotiable. The forced departure of Generals Arismendi and Hector Trujillo and other members of the family on 24 and 25 October met an important UCN demand. The 14 of June party (PCJ) had flatly refused to negotiate, while the Dominican Revolutionary party (PRD) felt obliged to halt its confidential talks with the government when the impression got around that it was "selling out" to the regime.

The largest opposition group is the UCN, whose leaders told the US consul general on 23 October that they still oppose entering the government as long as Ramfis remains. It claims a membership of 250,000 and has the backing of the majority of the country's professional and business people. Its president, Dr. Viriato A. Fiallo, has a record of opposition to the Trujillo dictatorship from its inception in 1930 and is respected by all segments of the opposition. He first became prominent as an active opponent of the 12-year US military occupation which ended in 1924. A strong nationalist, he is not basically anti-US, although he and a number of other UCN leaders feel the US was responsible for Trujillo's rise to power and some still harbor suspicions of present US intentions.

The PCJ was originally intended to be the political arm of the UCN, which was to be a broad nonpartisan movement. Several PCJ directors are also UCN leaders, but the PCJ also contains elements apparently inclined to the extreme left, and the

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Page 4

gulf between the two groups in the PCJ has been growing in recent months. Some of the most uncompromising and vengeful oppositionists, many of them victims of Trujillo brutalities, are aligned with the PCJ. The wife of Manuel Tavarez Justo, PCJ president, and her two sisters were tortured and killed by the Trujillo police last December. The PCJ, probably the smallest of the opposition groups, is believed strong among the student element. It takes its name from the date 14 June 1959 when an unsuccessful Cuban-supported invasion force landed in the Dominican Republic. Pro-Castro elements, however, now are generally identified with the recently outlawed Dominican Popular Movement. The PRD, perhaps the most politically astute opposition group, is oriented toward and receives regular guidance from such Latin American reformist leaders as Venezuelan President Betancourt and ex-President Figueres of Costa Rica.

PRD President Juan Bosch arrived in the Dominican Republic on 20 October after decades in exile. He had been preceded by three other former exiles who, in three months of political organization aimed particularly at the urban working class have

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built a significant political base.

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Approved For Release 2003/04/17: CIA-RDP79T00975A0060001-6 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Counsel to the President Military Representative of the President The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Under Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director

